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I. The past 100 years or so
There is little reluctance to acknowledge the role justices of the peace play in the justice
system; to the contrary, the vital functions the justices perform are routinely and unfailingly
recognized. 1 That said, there is a difference between acknowledging the importance of the office,
and understanding what it is. Thirty some years ago, Alan Mewett reported that “the duties and
functions of the Justice of the Peace are not always clearly understood by those in the criminal
justice system”, and added that he was not sure “all Justices of the Peace understand their own
duties and functions”. 2

At the time, Mewett attributed this lack of understanding to the “failure to commit enough
financial resources to the office of the Justice of the Peace”. 3 In 1981, he remarked that in the last
one hundred years or so the “prestige and visibility of the Justice of the Peace in the community
has slowly been whittled away”. 4 Paradoxically, he found that even as their role was being
downplayed, new responsibilities were being imposed on the justices. 5 Not only was their corner
of the system disorganized and chaotic, they were set apart from other judicial actors in their status
and roles as lay justices.
*Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. A short bio is attached to the paper as an appendix. I would like to thank
Justice Gerry Manno, Justice of the Peace and Osgoode Hall PhD candidate, and James C. Morton, for reading an
earlier draft of this paper. I also thank Robert Karass, Osgoode Hall J.D. 2013, for his assistance, and Kendall Grant,
J.D. Osgoode Hall 2015, for his research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1
See, e.g., Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857 at para. 5 (stating that justices of the peace, in many provinces, “have
come to occupy a critical role as the point of entry into the criminal justice system”); and Report of the Fourth
Ontario Justices of the Peace Remuneration Commission, 2007 (the “Cory Commission”) at 4 (stating that “perhaps
insufficient attention” has been given to the work of Ontario justices of the peace in the past) and 6 (making
remarks, not in criticism of earlier Commissions but “simply as a present day recognition and confirmation of the
exceedingly important work performed by Justices of the Peace”).
2
Alan w. Mewett, Report to the Attorney General of Ontario on the Office and Function of Justices of the Peace in
Ontario (the “Mewett report”)(1981), at 38.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid. at 55.
5
Ibid. at 38.
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By then, it had become evident that the need for change was compelling. Major reports
on the administration of justice in Ontario by the McRuer Commission and Ontario Law Reform
Commission (OLRC) stated the case for reform and laid the foundation for Professor Mewett,
whose terms of reference were exclusive to the office and function of Ontario’s justices of the
peace. 6 In due course, statutory reforms would be undertaken and the systemic problems
corrected, with the result that today’s office bears little resemblance to the office of the past.

This short paper has been written at the request of the Association of Justices of the Peace
of Ontario (AJPO), in preparation for the work of the Sixth Remuneration Commission, and its
purpose is to provide a context for that discussion. 7 It begins by observing that to situate
Ontario’s justices of the peace today, it is necessary to retrace the history from 1981 to the
present. Accordingly, the next section explains how the office was remodelled in the years after
the Mewett report, and what is significant about those reforms. In brief, the key point is that a
statutory framework that comprehensively addresses the governance of the office is now in
place. Not only do the structures established by this framework protect the independence and
professionalism of the justices, in doing so the statutory reforms took critical steps to bring
justices of the peace into closer alignment with other judicial officers in the province. This
narrative is significant because it is only by recalling the state of affairs in 1981 that the
transformative consequences of those reforms can truly be understood.

6

Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (the “McRuer Commission”)(1968), chapter 38; Report on the
Administration of Ontario Courts, Ontario Law Reform Commission (“OLRC report”) (1973).
7
In requesting a paper, the AJPO was clear that I should provide an update on the Mewett report that is academic
in nature. In the interest of readability it omits citations to the many statutes and statutory provisions referred to,
and also relies on website citations for reports and other materials that are accessible online.
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The structures and appointments of office are an important part of the evolution of
Ontario’s justices of the peace, but do not tell the whole story. In addition, the office needs to be
placed in the context of a system of justice that is complex, seamless, and highly interdependent.
All parts of the system are vital, and must function as smoothly as possible. From that
perspective, it is important to consider what justices of the peace do, and how that work has
changed over the years. A review of that work and the functions they serve confirms that
Ontario’s justices are a vital, indispensable, and integral part of the justice system.

A further observation is that a remaining difference between justices of the peace and
other members of the judiciary is their status, to this day, as lay justices. 8 This is not the time or
place to consider whether the office is an anomaly, or holdover from a bygone time before law
was professionalized. The respective merits of a professional or lay bench of justices of the peace
raise pivotal questions about policy and the design of justice. 9 Though this paper does not
directly engage that question and its implications for remuneration, two comments can be made.
The first is that access to justice is an overarching goal of the system, and that aspiration is
shared by and sought after as much by justices of the peace as by others. Yet this value cannot be
maximized unless it infuses all parts, and that requires resources to be spread fairly throughout

8

That, too, is changing. Although it is not a requirement, a recent figure indicates that 10% of Ontario’s justices are
legally trained; supra note 49. Anecdotal information suggests that the number is higher than that and might now
be in the range of 14-15%.
9
See Bill 97, the Ontario Justices of the Peace Modernization Act, 2012, a private member’s bill introduced by MPP
David Orazietti, which proposed a return to two classes for justices of the peace – presiding and administrative –
and introduced a requirement that those appointed as presiding have a law degree and five years’ experience as
practising lawyers. Bill 97 was one of 104 bills in process when the provincial legislature was prorogued on October
23, 2012. http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&Intranet=&BillID=2645

5

the system. More to the point, it is a reminder that justices of the peace should be integrated into
the rest of the system, and not set apart because of the unique history and evolution of the office.
The second accepts the difference in training between the justices and others, but cautions that its
significance can be overstated. Reforms to the office of Ontario justices of the peace have closed
the gaps on independence and professionalism that were glaring at the time of the Mewett report.
Though remaining differences should not be discounted, justices of the peace today are more like
other members of the judiciary than ever before.

II. Transforming the justices: from 1981 to the present
Urgent need
There could be no doubt whatsoever that the system for justices of the peace was in dire
need of reform. Years before the Mewett report was written, it had been harshly criticized by the
McRuer Commission, which dealt “emphatically” with the issues. In 1968, the McRuer report
noted that there were more than 500 justices of the peace who should never have been appointed,
and recommended that all existing appointments be cancelled and a “fresh start” made. 10 The
Commission also dismissed the role justices play in safeguarding the civil liberties of individuals
as “little more than a sham”. 11

Five years later, the OLRC’s Report on the Administration of Ontario Courts complained
that the exact number of justices in Ontario was unknown, and referred to an indeterminate group
of appointees, “whose names are not officially recorded anywhere”. 12 The report also observed

10

Cited in OLRC report, volume 2, supra note 6, at 17.
McRuer report, supra note 6, at 524 (cited in Ell v. Alberta, supra note 1, at para. 6).
12
OLRC report, supra note 6, at 17.
11
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that Ontario justices of the peace do not operate “within an organized framework” and
emphasized the “urgent need to establish some order and organization for the office”. 13 The
Commission used the language of “urgent need” a second time in calling for clarification of the
relationship between the JPs, and the provincial judges and their court system. 14

Unlike the McRuer and OLRC reports, which examined Ontario courts, Professor
Mewett’s landmark study focused exclusively on JPs and their part in the justice system. On
issue after issue relating to the structure and organization of the office, terms and conditions of
appointment, and workplace conditions, he called repeated attention to profound and ongoing
systemic problems. In doing so, he openly expressed anger and frustration about the state of
affairs and low status of Ontario’s justices of the peace. The Mewett report is in fact a chronicle
of neglect, which demonstrates how a vital part of the justice system was simply let go and left to
flounder, without structure, guidance, or resources. This theme of neglect surfaced again ten
years later, in a study of Canada’s justices of the peace headed up by Professor Doob.
Understanding Justices concluded, in more general terms, that many of the problems
surrounding justices of the peace in Canada “derive from their generally poor treatment by the
provinces”. 15

What follows are some of the Mewett report’s highlights and key findings. When the
report was written, Ontario’s justices of the peace were an ad hoc mix of full-time, part-time and
fee for service appointments, with little or no organization or to hold the system together or show
13

Ibid. at 16 (emphasis added).
Ibid.
15
A. Doob, P. Baranek, and S. Addario, Understanding Justices: A Study of Canadian Justices of the Peace (the
“Doob Report”), University of Toronto Centre of Criminology, 1991, at 250.
14

7

how it worked. On the issue of appointments, Mewett stated that “exactly what is meant by
‘qualifications’ is a matter of some doubt because no one has ever actually tried to articulate
precisely what is meant by being qualified to be a Justice of the Peace”. 16 Meanwhile, it was
widely perceived at the time that appointments had little to do with merit, and were more likely a
form of favouritism or reward. 17 Ten years later, and more than twenty years after the McRuer
Commission complained that there was no list of Ontario justices, the Doob report would reveal
that the Attorney General’s office “freely admitted that not only do they not have an accessible
list of justices of the peace, but they do not know who is a justice”. 18

Meanwhile, Mewett also discovered that the organization of work was profoundly
flawed. Who did what was governed by a system of “directions”, which classified justices of the
peace into one of five designations which then both determined and limited the assignment of
work. 19 Where justices sat and what kinds of assignments they drew depended on “directions”
that were hierarchical in nature, were treated as a badge of prestige, and were often granted, as a
result, “as a kind of reward”. 20 In Mewett’s words, the “’classification’ of the Justices of the
Peace [was] chaotic”, and he described the system as “hopelessly confused and unnecessarily
complex”. 21 It was hardly a surprise, in these circumstances, that workloads were irregular and
uneven. That problem was re-inforced, if not systemically ingrained, by the remuneration
practices of the day.

16

Mewett Report, supra note 2, at 67.
Doob report, supra note 15, at 19.
18
Ibid. at 19. According to the report, the Attorney General’s office began assembling a list in 1988.
19
Mewett report, supra note 2, at 10 (describing the five types of directions then in existence).
20
Ibid.at 17.
21
Ibid. at 14.
17
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The various methods and levels of remuneration were dysfunctional, not to mention
deeply unfair. Mewett declared it impossible to provide “any precise picture of the general level
of remuneration,” 22 and was deeply disturbed by the persistence of fee for service arrangements,
which he described as “utterly intolerable” and a reflection of the “complete ignorance of the
proper function and authority of the Justice of the Peace”. 23 He fumed that “this was nothing
more nor less than an invitation to a Justice of the Peace to abdicate his responsibility.” 24 As he
explained, “[t]he outrageous result is that some Justices are perceived both by the police and the
public as police Justices of the Peace while others pay for their rectitude by receiving little in the
way of fees”. 25

Regrettably, Ontario’s justices of the peace were not at all independent but were left,
instead, to fend for themselves without administrative structures, resources, or modest forms of
support. In a system in which they were virtually unknown, few justices were removed, though
tenure of office was insecure and the process then in place to deal with matters of competence
and removal was inadequate. In Mewett’s view, the Justices of the Peace Review Council fell
short of providing safeguards because “[s]ecurity, to be meaningful, must embrace not only
proper procedures to prevent the arbitrary revocation of the Commission … but also safeguards

22

Ibid. at 20.
Ibid. at 23.
24
Ibid. at 23.
25
Ibid.
23
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against arbitrary administrative maneuvers”. 26 He identified security of tenure as a critical
element of independence and wrote strongly of the need for this to be addressed. 27

At this point in time, the justices were still closely associated with the police and
entangled with law enforcement by the fee for service arrangement, as well as by physical
proximity. In the absence of court and office space, the default place of business for justices of
the peace was all too often the local police station. 28 Reliance on others for advice – whether
Crown lawyers, provincial court judges, or the police – posed another serious threat to their
independence. 29 Yet, as Mewett pointed out, the need for advice was unavoidable because
arrangements for the training and education of the justices were completely inadequate.

This pointed to another systemic problem, which was that little had been done to develop,
promote or protect the professionalism of Ontario’s justices. Mewett reported that access to
education, training, and independent sources of advice ranged at the time from the “virtually
non-existent to the barely acceptable, depending upon the location.” 30 The working conditions of
justices of the peace were also appalling: the justices lacked the minimal court and office space
needed to discharge their responsibilities, and otherwise had almost no amenities. As Mewett

26

Ibid. at 32.
Ibid. at 56 (stating that “[h]e should enjoy independence in his decision-making functions, free from pressure or
interference and thus must enjoy some measure of security in his office, subject to being dismissed only for cause
and only after due process”).
28
Ibid. at 33. As he put it, “the one location where a Justice of the Peace should not have office facilities is in a
police station,” and added that “[i]t is hardly worth belabouring such an obvious point save to say that this is highly
improper”.
29
Mewett found it especially objectionable that the justices at times took advice from the police. As he explained,
“[j]ustice is not done nor can it be seen to be done unless the independence of the Justice of the Peace is
maintained by an arm’s length relationship with the police,” and added that “it is grossly improper for any police
officer to offer unsolicited advice to a Justice of the Peace”. Ibid. at 27.
30
Ibid. at 19.
27

10

once again lamented, “[t]he reason is that no one has objectively decided precisely what the
needs of the Justices of the Peace are”. 31

Though the remark was made in a different context, it would have been just as apt to
describe this as “[t]he old system of amateurish JPs.”32 Having made the findings discussed
above, Mewett challenged this demoralized state of affairs and called on the province to restore
the office of the justices. He wrote in insightful terms of the role justices of the peace play, and
declared that without them the justice system “as we know it would collapse.” 33 His report
offered a battery of recommendations which addressed the two most serious deficits – a lack
independence and professionalism – by proposing structural change. In the meantime, the
justices lacked authority and institutional resources, and were powerless to address these issues
on their own. It was therefore a matter of waiting for the legislature to undertake the far-reaching
changes Mewett and others had identified as compelling, and even urgent in nature.

Transformative change
Through an incremental process of law reform, the justice of the peace’s office has been
all but transformed in the interval since the Mewett report. It is useful to begin by placing book
ends around the starting and end points of this narrative, because the contrast could hardly be
more striking. It would not be an exaggeration, nor would it be unfair, to describe the office, as
Mewett found it in 1981, as backward in every way. Now it is the opposite: today, independence
and professionalism are the hallmarks and defining features of Ontario’s justices of the peace.

31

Ibid. at 33.
Doob report, supra note 15, at 39 (the quote was in reference to justices of the peace in New Brunswick).
33
Mewett report, supra note 2, at 38.
32
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Legal institutions in Ontario have changed greatly in the last fifty years, but none perhaps
as much as the system for justices of the peace. This transformation was achieved by wholesale
change throughout the system, on qualifications and the appointments process; court
administration; professional training and education; tenure and removal; and remuneration. The
three key steps in the process were the statutory reforms of 1989; 34 the development of a
remuneration commission for justices of the peace (1995; 1999); 35 and the comprehensive
reforms introduced by the Access to Justice Act, 2006. 36 These reforms cannot be placed in any
hierarchy of importance but should be viewed collectively, because nothing short of an overhaul
would have been able to fix the deep-seated problems of the system.

Starting with the office itself, the current statutory framework defines the lines of
authority and procedures that regulate and professionalize the process of appointment. The 1989
legislation took an important first step in empowering the Justices of the Peace Review Council
to consider all appointments and designations, and to make reports to the Attorney General.37
That said, the reforms that were necessary to professionalize the process more fully were not
undertaken until the Access to Justice Act was passed in 2006. This legislation introduced

34

An Act to revise the Justices of the Peace Act, S.O. 1989, c.46.
The first commission on remuneration of justices of the peace, which made its report in 1995, was litigated; see
Re Ontario Federation of Justices of the Peace Association v. Ontario (AG) (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 541. In 1999 the
legislation was amended to provide for the establishment of a Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission, S.O.
1999, c.12, sched B, s.12(2). Report of the Second Ontario Justices of the Peace Commission, 2000, at 4 and 1.
http://www.justice.gov.yk.ca/pdf/Tab_17_Report_of_2000_Ontario_Justices_of_the_Peace_Remuneration_Com
mission.pdf
36
S.O. 2006, c.21, schedule B, Amendments to the Justices of the Peace Act and the Public Authorities Protection
Act.
37
Section 9 of the 1989 legislation established the composition of the Council, as follows: the Chief Judges of the
Provincial Court, Criminal and Family Divisions; the Co-ordinator; a justice of the peace; and no more than two
other persons. Supra note 34.
35
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important provisions dealing, respectively, with the designation of justices of the peace, their
qualifications, and the appointments process.

First, while the 1989 legislation followed Mewett’s recommendation and adopted his
proposal to designate justices as presiding or non-presiding, the 2006 statute abandoned the
distinction and all justices of the peace are now appointed as presiding justices. 38 What it means
is that the lingering hierarchy between classes of justices is now discontinued and will be phased
out over time, in favour of an office in which all justices are equal and authorized, without
restriction in the terms of their appointment, to assume all duties. Second, while it allocated
responsibility for appointments to a committee of professionals, the 1989 legislation did not set
minimum qualifications for justices of the peace. In 1981, Mewett decided against pre-existing
knowledge of the court system as a prerequisite for appointment, though he did recommend
minimum education levels (grade XII), and the rudiments of a more rigorous process of
appointment. 39 Minimum qualifications for office were prescribed by statute for the first time in
2006, and now those seeking appointment as a justice of the peace must have a university
education and ten years’ experience in order to qualify. 40 Again, it bears noting that the
education and experience of those in office will be raised and equalized over time, as more
appointments are made under this regime.

38

2006 legislation, s.4(1). Supra note 36.
Mewett report, supra, note 2, at 67-71 (explaining his recommendations on qualifications and the process of
appointment).
40
2006 legislation, supra note 36, s.2.1 (15)-(17) (prescribing these qualifications, as well as providing for
equivalency programs and exceptional qualifications).
39
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Third, the 2006 statute also refined and developed the process around appointments by
creating a Justices of the Peace Appointment Advisory Committee, institutionalizing its
functions, and charging the committee with the responsibility to recruit, identify, classify, and
recommend candidates for appointment. 41 As a result of these initiatives, the process of
appointment today is rigorous, transparent, and accountable. 42 It bears no resemblance
whatsoever to the practices of the past, and the systemic problems discussed in the Mewett report
have been fully remedied.

The statutory amendments also addressed other elements of the justices’ independence
and professionalism. Access to training and education, which had been abysmal in the past, is an
explicit objective of justice of the peace governance today. Under s.13 of the 2006 Act, the
Associate Chief Justice Co-ordinator of Justices of the Peace has responsibility for standards of
conduct for the justices. Among the goals s.13(3) identifies are “1. Recognizing the
independence of justices of the peace,” and “5. “emphasizing the need to ensure the on-going
development of justices of the peace and the growth of their social awareness through continuing
education”. 43 Ontario Court of Justice reports in 2005 and again in 2008-2009 provide detail
about the content and structure of training and education for justices of the peace today. 44

41

Ibid. at s.21.1 (1)-(22) (prescribing the Committee’s operations in close detail).
For an example, see Annual Report of the Justices of the Peace Appointments Advisory Committee; September
2009-August 2010 (Toronto; August 2011) http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/files/annualreport/jpaac/2009-2010EN.pdf
43
2006 legislation, supra note 36, s.13.
44
See Ontario Court of Justice Annual Report 2005, at 63 (explaining the Senior Advisory Justice of the Peace and
that individual’s responsibility for planning, development, and implementation of education and training programs
for justices of the peace): http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/files/annualreport/ocj/2005-EN.pdf; and Ontario Court
of Justice Biennial Report, 2008-2009 at 59 (explaining the Advisory Committee on Education and the role it plays
in ensuring that JPs receive the highest quality judicial education):
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/ocj/publications/biennial-report-2008-2009/
42
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As noted, security of tenure and the due process machinery of investigation and removal
were key concerns of Mewett’s. The 1989 legislation addressed these questions by prescribing a
detailed process to be followed in cases of discipline or removal. 45 That process was also
modified and improved by the 2006 legislation, which created a complaints committee and
prescribed a line of accountability in the process, which moves from the complaints committee to
a hearing panel, and ultimately to the Attorney General. 46 While the details are important, the
central point for present purposes, once again, is that the lack of governance in the past has now
been cured by the development of an institutional framework. Notably, the process has been
structured to protect the public interest in the professionalism of its justices of the peace, and yet
does so within a framework of due process that safeguards the security of tenure of justices and
respects their judicial independence.

Summarizing to this point, the reform protocols on qualifications and appointment,
training and education, tenure of office and removal significantly upgraded the justice of the
peace’s office. There is one more critical step to note in the process of reform, and this one took
place at the administrative level. McRuer, the OLRC and Mewett were in agreement that the
system was in a state of serious dysfunction. This, too, was addressed by the creation of the
Ontario Court of Justice and the introduction of administrative structures to manage the orderly

See also the Justices of the Peace Education plan, Ontario Courts of Justice website:
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/jprc/education-plan/
45
1989 legislation, supra note 34, ss. 8-12.
46
2006 legislation, supra note 36, ss.10.2-11.2 (dealing with all aspects of complaint, investigation, hearing, report,
and removal).
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assignment, supervision and monitoring of the justices. 47 These measures made an enormous
difference in providing organization, structure, and direction to the office and work of the
justices of the peace.

To conclude this discussion, a couple of observations can be made about remuneration. In
the past, justices of the peace were not only poorly paid, as Mewett and others have found, but
the remuneration scheme was unprincipled and incoherent. This section has shown how
demoralized and lacking in integrity the system was in 1981, when Mewett made his
recommendations. His call for the restoration of the office was heeded, and though it has taken
many years most of those recommendations have been implemented. The system of fee-forservice was abolished in 1995, and Ontario’s justices of the peace today are salaried on a full,
part-time or per diem basis. The patent unfairnesses of the old system have been corrected and
remuneration commissions have been in place since 1995.

It is important to ensure that the remuneration for justices of the peace keeps pace with,
and reflects, the transformations of recent years. Though the pace of change was incremental, the
legislature has comprehensively addressed the systemic problems that compromised the
independence and professionalism of Ontario’s justices of the peace. The structures now in place
create a statutory framework that rationalizes the office, treats the justices as judicial officers,
and equips them to discharge their responsibilities. There cannot be any doubt that the office of
the justices has been radically transformed for the better.
47

The 1989 legislation created the office of “Co-ordinator of Justices of the Peace” and empowered the Coordinator to administer the justices of the peace, under the direction of the Chief Judges of the Provincial Court;
supra note 34. Under s. 12 of the 2006 legislation, the “Associate Chief Justice Co-ordinator of Justices of the
Peace” assumed this responsibility; supra note 36.
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Since 2006, Ontario’s justices of the peace have been serving as full-fledged members of
the judiciary whose terms of appointment, tenure, and administrative structures have been
brought under a governance structure that introduced transparency and accountability into all
aspects of the office. Moreover, though a law degree is not now a prerequisite for appointment,
the gap in qualifications which was once so dramatic has narrowed as a result of the
amendments. At present, 10% of Ontario’s justices of the peace are legally trained, and under the
2006 legislation justices will bring higher qualifications to the office over time, as those who
lack those qualifications age and gradually become eligible for retirement. 48

The transformation that took place between the 1981 Mewett report and the present could
hardly have been more remarkable. Against the backdrop of these signal developments, it
remains now to consider the work itself and ask how justices of the peace fit into the larger
scheme of justice in the province.

III. A context of justice
It is important to understand the institutional design of the office – as described above –
because it is the setting in which Ontario’s justices of the peace work today. In turning to their
work, it can be noted that there are two ways to understand the role of the justices: while the first
considers the jurisdiction they exercise from day to day, the second reflects on the functions of
office from a more conceptual perspective. In doing so, that approach looks beyond the formal
details of jurisdiction to consider the role justices of the peace play and how that role fits the

48

Reported in Press Release, “New Orazietti Bill proposes Improvements to Ontario Justice System”, May 31, 2012:
http://www.saultstar.com/2012/05/31/new-orazietti-bill-proposes-improvements-to-ontario-justice-system
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overall scheme of justice in Ontario today. A holistic view of Ontario’s justices of the peace – a
context of justice, as it were – requires attention to both.

The details of justice of the peace jurisdiction are disparate, and it can be difficult to gain
a sense of the office without a consolidated overview. Generally speaking, justices of the peace
exercise jurisdiction that is at once specific and limited, and astonishingly broad at the same
time. Their powers arise under federal as well as provincial legislation, and engage a wide range
of statutes and tasks. On its face, the scope of jurisdiction is striking because it points to the
diverse and extensive responsibilities that are entrusted to the justices under all manner of
statutory instruments. Though the volume of work may be concentrated in particular areas, the
justices must be prepared, through training and resources, to deal effectively and fairly with all
matters falling in their jurisdiction.

For example, justices of the peace are empowered by the terms of the Contraventions Act
to hear charges under certain federal statutes, including the Fisheries Act, Canada Shipping Act,
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Motor Vehicle Transport Act, Indian Act, and
Migratory Birds Act, among many others. Justices of the peace also handle a variety of tasks
under the Criminal Code; they issue summonses and warrants for the arrest of the accused, deal
with applications for publication bans, preside over matters involving adjournments and
remands, and put the accused to their election on mode of trial. 49 Another function that was

49

Although authorized by the Criminal Code to do so, Ontario’s justices of the peace do not conduct trials for
summary conviction offences.
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traditionally important, and remains salient today, concerns the role justices of the peace play in
receiving private informations under the Criminal Code, and conducting pre-enquête hearings. 50
In addition, and more to the point, justices of the peace are the workhorses of the
provincial regulatory system. Ontario’s justices enforce a wide array of more than 250 statutes,
as well as countless municipal by-laws. 51 Some of the issues which fall in their jurisdiction under
the Provincial Offences Act (“POA”) include motor vehicles (i.e., Highway Traffic Act,
Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act), occupational health and safety (i.e., Occupational
Health & Safety Act, Workplace Safety and Insurance Act), environmental protection (i.e.,
Environmental Protection Act ), the regulation of controlled substances (i.e., Liquor Licence Act,
Smoke-Free Ontario Act), safety regulation (i.e., Food Safety and Quality Act), consumer
protection (i.e., Consumer Protection Act, Consumer Reporting Act), and public order (i.e.,
Trespass to Property Act, Safe Streets Act, Dog Owner’s Liability Act). In addition to hearing
charges and adjudicating offences, justices of the peace issue warrants under Christopher’s Law
and the Child and Family Services Act, and make orders for medical examinations under the
Mental Health Act.

In any year and by any measure, the volume of work that arises under the POA is
immense. Though the information is dated, Strathy J. stated in 2008 that in an average year
Ontario justices of the peace will deal with more than 1,700,000 charges under the POA. 52 More
recently, the Law Commission of Ontario’s (“LCO”) Final Report, Modernization of the
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Provincial Offences Act” analyzed the work by volume and offence; in 2011, it reported that
“approximately 2 million charges were laid in Ontario over each of the past three years under
offence-creating statutes to which the POA applies”. 53 Under any view of the numbers, it is clear
that the efficiency, integrity, and legitimacy of provincial regulation rest on justices of the peace.
The statutes they enforce set standards for the health, safety and protection of Ontario residents,
and it is vitally in the public interest that the system be adequately resourced and effectively
administered.

In the words of the LCO, “[r]egulatory law dominates many aspects of our daily living”,
and the POA has a significant impact on the lives of Ontarians, “not merely because of the vast
number of offences to which the POA applies or the number of proceedings commenced each
year, but because of the nature of the regulatory offences governed by its process”. 54 These laws
are “necessary to regulate and reduce the risk we impose on each other through activities as
diverse as driving a car, operating a school, spraying a herbicide or constructing a nuclear power
plant”. 55 This regulatory framework, comprising a large number of diverse statutes, is at the core
of the provincial government’s mandate and responsibility to enact and enforce laws which
advance and protect the public welfare, broadly understood.

The Law Commission’s report was undertaken because the “provincial offences
environment has changed considerably” and yet there have been only modest amendments to the
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POA since it was enacted, more than thirty years ago. 56 The LCO’s catalogue of changes
includes these items: the adoption of the Charter, amendments to the Criminal Code,
significantly increased maximum penalties for certain provincial offences, the increased use of
administrative monetary penalties (AMPS), the emergence of licensed paralegals, and the
increased use of technology. 57 In advancing many recommendations for reform, the Commission
remarked that “[t]oday, respect for the administration of justice, speed, efficiency and a
convenient or simple process remain laudable goals for a procedure that governs the adjudication
of minor offences”, and added that “[t[]hese are particularly important objectives where the vast
majority of defendants are self-represented”. 58 Though the LCO’s analysis of these changes was
directed at its recommendations for reform, its analysis provides insight into the impact of
change on the work of the justices in managing and enforcing this vast network of regulation.

Justices of the peace also have primary and almost exclusive responsibility for the
administration of criminal justice in two critical areas: search warrants and bail hearings. Search
warrants are the engine of the investigative process and are highly regulated by the Criminal
Code provisions and the case law, including Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence under s.8 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 59 To protect the integrity of investigations, the warrant
process must be ex parte in nature. In reviewing applications and issuing warrants, justices of the
peace therefore must have a strong command of the technical details of the law, which is in a
56
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constant process of change, both by legislative amendment and judicial interpretation. The
justices must understand the demands of the investigative process but also exercise vigilance on
behalf of the subject of search, who is not present and unable, therefore, to defend the privacy
interests at stake that are constitutionally protected by s.8.

This task engages critical values on both sides – law enforcement on one and the
expectation of privacy and freedom from unreasonable intrusion from the state on the other. In
the circumstances of ex parte proceedings, transparency and accountability only come into play
after the fact, when search warrants have been executed. That points up the need for justices to
take great care initially in considering and authorizing searches that will unavoidably infringe
privacy rights. Evidence that is illegally obtained can be excluded at trial, if and when the
circumstances surrounding the application for a warrant or its execution are challenged by the
accused. 60 In addition, applications for access to warrant material may be made and appear to be
becoming more common, as investigative journalists seek information about police activities and
the targets of their investigations. Though the media’s primary interest is in who the police are
interested in and why, the process also comes to light and can become a matter of public interest
and debate. In brief, then, these are some of the reasons why responsibility for search warrants is
a critical element of the justices’ work. 61
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Even so, bail hearings may be the most challenging part of the justices’ work today.
Although this short discussion focuses on bail under the Criminal Code, it can be noted in
passing that – albeit less frequently – the justices are also responsible for bail hearings under the
POA. 62 Hearings under the Code are conducted in open court, albeit pursuant to a publication
ban, and under a requirement that those detained be presented before a justice within 24 hours.
This timeline creates obvious pressures, especially in cases of mass arrests, which place demands
on the availability of courtrooms and justices of the peace. Bail hearings are important because
they may constitute an offender’s first interface with the court system, in circumstances where
the outcome will be either that the accused will be detained in prison or released to the
community. 63 Although the right to bail is guaranteed by s.11(e) of the Charter, the issues that
arise at these hearings are far from straightforward and bail is not a simple matter. 64

The constitutional right not to be denied bail is subject to statutory exceptions that have
been upheld under the Charter. These exceptions allow the Crown to “show cause” and
demonstrate why it is justifiable to deny bail and detain an accused instead. The process can be
complicated by reverse onus provisions, which in some instances shift the burden from the
Crown and ask or invite the accused to “show cause” why he or she should be released. In
addition, the Charter right is qualified under s.11(e) by the language of “reasonable bail”, which
introduces the question of conditional release – restrictions on an accused’s release as a condition
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of bail – and whether such restrictions are reasonable. Starting from a presumption of bail
without limits or unconditional release, justices of the peace are required to determine where to
place an accused on the “ladder” of conditions that are increasingly restrictive of liberty. Here,
the justices have considerable discretion in balancing the public interest in preventing flight and
protecting the community from risk, against the right of the accused to be presumed innocent and
granted as much liberty as is reasonable, in the circumstances. 65

This brief summary demonstrates that the bail decision is an adjudicative function of
crucial importance. Those charged with offences are entitled to be presumed innocent pending
trial, and to benefit from the presumption in favour of reasonable bail. Denying bail or attaching
restrictive conditions engage the Charter rights of the accused. At the same time, the community
has a strong stake in proceedings which can be highly controversial, especially in cases where
violent crimes which generate fear, revulsion and strong emotion have been committed. All this
to say that the bail system places heavy demands on the criminal justice system, ones that are
difficult to satisfy. It is at the core of the system, not only because the outcomes of proceedings
are so closely watched – although the details are protected by publication bans – but also because
the system must balance the argument for detention against the presumption in favour of bail. In
doing so, the decision whether to grant bail implicates access to justice values and raises basic
questions about what justice means. For these reasons, the bail system is a frequent subject of
study and critical comment. 66
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The criminal justice system in Ontario has changed dramatically since the Mewett report
was written in 1981, one year before the introduction of the Charter. It is obvious to all how
much the Charter’s legal rights and equality guarantees, among others, have transformed the
criminal law in the last thirty years. The justices of the peace and the corners of the Criminal
Code they administer are no exception. Yet the Charter is not the only source of change; as the
LCO noted, the provincial regulatory framework has become much more complex in recent
years, and the same can be said of the Criminal Code. The criminal law continues to be
amended, and interpreted by the appellate courts on issues of statutory interpretation as well as
on questions arising under the Charter. LeSage and Code have written of these changes in the
particular context of large and complex trials. 67 In that setting they observed that “[w]e therefore
begin with the realization that the criminal trial will never be what it was in the 1970s. We are
operating today in a very different legal context.” 68 Though the justices do not face the same
challenges, they are not immune from the cluster of changes, pressures, and demands that have
affected the courts systemically in recent years. 69
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The parameters of jurisdiction surveyed also invite broader reflection or comment on the
“office” of the justices and their role in the system. The Mewett report (1981) and Doob report
(1991) gave this question significant attention, though the focus since then has been on practical
realities and the details of office, as recounted to this point (i.e., matters of structure and design;
scope of jurisdiction; workload). Yet it is just as true today as it was when Mewett wrote it:
without justices of the peace the criminal justice system would collapse. 70 Despite that reality –
and the likelihood the justices may be more indispensable today than before – being set apart and
for a long time treated as a subordinate part of the system is part of their narrative. That is the
essential ambivalence of their history: to be respected and yet set apart, at the same time, for
being different, or singular. Lingering negative perceptions from the past cannot be fully set
aside, once and for all, without first being brought into the open and acknowledged.

Mewett and Doob clearly valued the distinctive role lay justices play in our justice
system. Citing a host of examples from a checklist of their functions, the Mewett report lauded
justices of the peace as “the first line of defence against abuse of process,” and identified the
justices as “in fact the original, and still essential, ombudsman”. 71 The report also warned that if
the office were to be abolished or even “demeaned or reduced in function, directly or indirectly”,
the result would be that “these safeguards and rights of the citizen [will] inevitably [be] made
less secure”. 72 Nor did it discount their role or contribution because of their status as lay justices.
To the contrary, the report accepted that justices of the peace are “judicial officers in every sense
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of the word” and spoke of the justices as “judges and protectors of the individual”. 73 Mewett
called for justices of the peace to be “capable, independent and fearless” in the performance of
duties and exercise of office, and made recommendations that showed what was required for that
to happen. 74 In addition, he cautioned against drawing comparisons between justices of the peace
and judges that are based on differences in training. Professor Mewett spoke against comparing
the relative importance of JPs and other judges and said, instead, that “[t]hey are both equally, if
differently, important in the criminal justice system”. 75 In his view the salary of a justice of the
peace should be “at a level that reflects his importance and prestige”. 76

Ten years later, the Doob report conducted social science research to learn more about
Canada’s justices of the peace, and in doing so canvassed the justices from several provinces –
including Ontario – on virtually all issues addressed by Mewett. 77 The gist of this report is best
summarized in the words of its authors, and that is “taking justices seriously.” 78 Though the
report is nearly twenty-five years in the past, it offers insights which linger to this day, and for
that reason should not be forgotten. What emerges from the Doob report is a conception of role
that shows why lay justices are a valuable and distinctive feature of the system. It speaks to the
“bewildering variety of roles” undertaken by justices of the peace, 79 and describes these
functions in the words of the justices, who referred to themselves – variously and candidly – as a
“buffer, facilitator, rubber stamp, protector of the public interest,” and also described themselves
73
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as executive assistant to justice, handmaiden to the police, the sponge of trivia from court
dockets, and independent judicial officer. 80 The justices commented on their function as a
“middleman”, “buffer” and “barrier” between an “overactive policeman, and a member of the
public; they spoke of the need for JPs “to ensure that the rights of people are protected as well as
the rights of the public as a whole”. 81 As one justice put it, quite insightfully: “I am totally
independent … In essence, a JP represents twelve good men [sic] in truth – the jury”. 82 The same
justice continued by adding, along similar lines, that, unlike judges, the justices are able to look
at questions “more from a citizen’s point of view.” 83

The Mewett and Doob reports both also spoke of the ways justices of the peace had been
neglected or poorly treated. The Doob report took the pulse of the justices and in doing so
validated many of their concerns: the office was perceived as one of low status; the justices were
poorly paid; and they experienced a lack of respect across the spectrum, which in turn reinforced their position in the system. Through questionnaires they spoke of feeling undermined
or devalued because they are considered to be lay justices and generally are not legally trained. 84
As the Doob report explained, the “apparent low status” of justices of the peace affected other
aspects of their jobs, such as being poorly paid, not given adequate offices, and generally being
treated in a manner that would not be considered appropriate for other judicial officers. 85

80

Ibid. at 41.
Ibid. at 28.
82
Ibid. at 24.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid. at 250.
85
Ibid. at 250.
81

28

It is obvious, and important, to note that that was then and this is now. Today, the justices
of the peace remain unique in the system because in Ontario they serve, for the most part, as lay
justices, and undertake their responsibilities under a series of mandates that are vast but
delineated by statute. For that reason many of their functions are singular, and are not replicated
elsewhere in the system. By virtue of their functions, the justices are in the front lines and are
connected to the community in ways that are not possible for other judicial officers. At the same
time, the office has been transformed, and Ontario’s justices of the peace have been brought into
closer alignment with other members of the judiciary. They are more like others and yet remain
different. Even so, the justices have retained what is distinctive and valuable in their role, and the
dysfunctional elements of the office – which had more to do with the administration of the office
than anything the justices controlled – have been ameliorated.

Not unexpectedly, it may take time for attitudes to catch up with changes to the office.
While the 2006 reforms are relatively recent, perceptions and impressions of the justices, in the
broader public as well as in the legal profession, may be deep-seated. It bears emphasizing that
these reforms were pushing back against a history of neglect which, according to Mewett, was
100 years in the making. In 1981, he called for the office of the justices of the peace to be
restored and the justices to be accorded the respect they deserve. It is not so much a question of
equating justices of the peace with others as it is of recognizing them, in Mewett’s words, as
“equally, if differently, important”. For that to happen, any lingering perceptions of the justices
as low-status judges must explicitly and definitively be placed in the past, once and for all.

Conclusion

29

In words that have been cited many times, Strathy J. made the following observations
about Ontario’s justices of the peace in 2008. He noted the progress that had been made in
reforming the office, and stated that “the qualifications of the bench have been enhanced, the
tenure of the justices have been made more secure and the processes and procedures surrounding
the office have been made more professional, more formal and, in a word, more ‘judicial”. 86 He
went on to comment that this evolution reflects the important role the justices play in the
administration of justice in Ontario and the significance the legislature attaches to that role. To
him, these were fundamental, and evinced a desire on the part of the province to attract highly
qualified applicants and to provide a structure, within the framework of judicial independence, to
support the performance of the justices’ responsibilities. 87

Ontario’s justices of the peace have come a long way since 1981 and the Mewett report.
In the circumstances, statutory reform was imperative, and the province should be commended
for taking the steps that were needed to overhaul the system. At the same time, two other
developments which are closely related are just as critical and should not be understated. The
first concerns the evolution of judicial independence and the recognition that justices of the
peace are members of the judiciary, and included as such in the scope of the constitutional
concept of judicial independence. 88 If it seems obvious, any review of the Mewett report would
show how pivotal a step it was to interpret the principle inclusively, thereby recognizing the
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judicial status of the justices and the need to protect their independence. 89 The second is the
establishment of remuneration commissions for the justices, as for other members of the
provincial judiciary, and the institutionalization of a process to ensure that their circumstances
are openly and fairly assessed at regular intervals. That, as well, was a step of immense
significance in the evolution of the office. No single step on its own would have been enough to
bring independence and professionalism to the office of the justice of the peace but, taken
together, the three in combination brought about a remarkable transformation.

As indicated at the outset, the purpose of this paper has been to retrace the history of the
justices, from the Mewett report to the present. In doing so, it situates the justices in 1981, before
reforms were undertaken, and then shows how profoundly the office has been transformed. The
hope, in tracing that history, is that it can provide a “context of justice” for understanding
Ontario’s justices of the peace and their role in the justice system.
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